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1. Introduction 
In a seminal contribution, Poole (1970) has analyzed how the monetary policy authority can 
choose between employing an interest rate or a monetary aggregate as its policy instrument. He 
has shown that the stochastic structure of the economy, i.e. the relative importance of different 
disturbances, would determine the optimal instrument choice. Since then, a large literature has 
been developed to examine this issue by incorporating other factors ignored in Poole’s model, 
notably inflation, expectations, and aggregate supply disturbances on the one hand, and to 
extend the framework for investigating the role of policy targets, intermediate targets, and 
information in the conduct of policy on the other hand (Sargent and Wallace 1975, B. 
Friedman 1975, Craine and Havenner 1981, Turnovsky 1980, Canzoneri et al. 1983, 
McCallum 1988).1 The Poole’s analysis has also inspired the literature on central bank’s 
operating procedures (Goodfriends 1983, Waller 1990, Walsh 1982, 2003). Recent general 
discussions about the optimal instrument choice for the objectives of achieving price and 
output stability include McCallum (1999, 2005) and Woodford (2008). Some studies explore 
Poole-type scenarios within modern general equilibrium models (Carlstrom and Fuerst 1995, 
Ireland 2000, Galì 2003, Collard and Dellas 2005, Hoffmann and Kempa 2009). Current 
financial crisis contributes to renew the debate over the optimal instrument choice by including 
the objective of financial stability for the central bank. Goodhart et al. (2009) suggest that the 
interbank interest rate is the optimal monetary instrument for prudential purposes and can be 
used for ensuring the financial stability. This contrasts with the analysis of De Grauwe and 
Gros (2009) who consider that the central bank must use a second instrument (reserve 
requirement or macro-prudential measures) besides the interest rate to simultaneously stabilize 
inflation expectations and the financial markets.  
                                                          
1 See Friedman B. (1990) and Walsh (2003) for a survey.  
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The Poole’s analysis has had a considerable impact on the practice of monetary policy 
making. Observing increasing instability in money demand due to financial innovation in the 
1970s and 1980s, many central banks have abandoned money supply rules in favour of interest 
rate targets, considered to have the advantage of being more transparent.2 In practice, major 
central banks in the world usually target the very short-run interest rates (Walsh, 2003). In the 
case of the Fed, Goodfriend (1991) has shown that central bankers prefer continuity of the 
short rate and indirect rate targeting because this gives the Fed, accepting the risk of being 
misinterpreted, the option of quietly changing its target.  
We remark that most theoretical studies examining the optimal instrument choice do not 
distinguish the short run interbank rate and other medium and long run rates affecting 
aggregate demand. In the absence of distinction between these interest rates, one well-known 
result obtained in the literature is: increased financial sector volatility (notably, money demand 
or money multiplier shocks) increases the desirability of an interest rate oriented policy 
procedure. If the main source of short-run instability arises from aggregate spending, a policy 
that stabilizes a monetary aggregate will lead to greater output stability. Since the money 
demand is viewed as highly unstable and difficult to predict over short time horizons since the 
1980s, the consensus among policy analysts is that greater output stability can be achieved by 
stabilizing interest rates, letting monetary aggregates fluctuate. However, this result is obtained 
in a framework where the control of market interest rates is very simplified, i.e. the central 
banks directly controls the lending interest rates at which consumers and firms borrow to 
consume and to invest.  
The aim of this paper is to reexamine the above consensus by using an IS-LM model 
extended to include the money supply as function of monetary base and market interest rate, 
                                                          
2 The stability of the money demand is used by the Bundesbank to justify its money supply targeting. The stability 
of velocity empirically observed in the Euro zone is often cited for justifying the monetary pillar in the two-pillar 
strategy of the European Central Bank. 
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and the reserve market on which are determined the funds interest rate and total reserves given 
the central bank’s discount interest rate. It is shown that increased financial sector volatility 
does not increase the desirability of an interest rate oriented policy procedure if its focus is the 
funds rate. Our study, by focusing on financial frictions in the first stage of the transmission 
mechanism of an interest rate policy, is related to some studies which examine the final stage 
of this transmission mechanism and analyze the responsiveness of the banking system to 
various monetary policy tools when determining the lending interest rates.3 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an IS-LM 
model integrating a money supply function and the equilibrium condition on the reserve 
market. The third section summarizes the standard analysis of optimal instrument choice under 
three alternative operating procedures, i.e. monetary supply, interest rate and monetary base 
procedures. The fourth section examines the macroeconomic performance under the funds rate 
operating procedure in comparing it with the monetary base procedure. The final section 
concludes. 
   
2. The Model 
Aggregate spending and money market equilibrium condition are respectively given by:  
ttt uiy     ,                    0   ,                                                                (1) 
tttt viym   ,               0 ,                              (2)  
where ty  is the actual output, ti  the nominal interest rate at which banks lend to non-financial 
private agents, and tm  the money supply. The variables y  and m  are expressed in natural 
logarithm. tu  and tv  are respectively mean-zero disturbances affecting the demand of goods 
and the demand of money with their respective variance given by 2u  and 
2
v .  
                                                          
3 See e.g. Aftalion and White (1977) and VanHoose (1985). 
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Equation (1) represents the IS curve and stipulates that the aggregate spending depends on 
the nominal interest rate since the realized and expected inflation rates are assumed to be zero. 
Equation (2) represents the LM curve with a real money demand depending on real income and 
the nominal interest rate.  
The link between the money supply and the monetary base is modeled as follows:4   
tttt hibm  ,   0h  .        (3) 
where tb )log( tMB  is the monetary base in log terms, and money multiplier ( tt bm  , in log 
terms) is assumed to be an increasing function of nominal interest rate, and t  is a random 
money-multiplier disturbance with mean zero and variance 2 . The monetary base tMB can 
be decomposed in two distinct parts, i.e. the total reserve tTR and currency tC . The latter is 
assumed to be fixed and it generally accounts for the majority of the monetary base. In log 
terms, we have: 
tttttt cC
MB
C
TR
MB
TR
MBb )1(logloglog
*
*
*
*
  ,    (4) 
where tt TRlog , tt Cc log , *
*
MB
TR  and the superscript asterisk designs the steady state.  
We extend the model by introducing a simplified description of the reserve market. The 
central bank conducts open market operations to affect the supply of reserves in the banking 
system and the funds rate, fti , the interest rate banks in need of reserves pay to borrow from 
banks with surplus reserves. Variations in the total quantity of bank reserves are associated 
with movements in broader money (M1, M2, etc.). Similarly, movements in the funds rate 
influence other market interest rates. The latter are represented in this model by ti  for 
simplification. If the central bank controls the discount rate ( dti ), total reserves will depend on 
                                                          
4 See Modigliani et al. (1970), and McCallum and Hoehn (1983). 
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d
ti  and the monetary base tb  will be endogenous. Reserve demand arises primarily from the 
requirement that banks hold reserves equal to a specified fraction of their deposit liability and 
is assumed to be a negative function of fti .  Other factors such as aggregate income and prices 
are simply treated as part of the error term, dt , i.e. a disturbance of reserve demand with mean 
zero and variance 2d . The function of total reserve demand is:   
d
t
f
t
d
t
d
t aiTR   log .              (5) 
The total supply of reserves held by banking system can be expressed as the sum of the 
reserves that banks have borrowed from the central bank ( tBR ) plus nonborrowed reserves 
( tNBR ), i.e. tt
s
t NBRBRTR  . Expressed in log terms, we have: 
nb
t
b
ttt
s
t
s
t NBR
TR
NBR
BR
TR
BR
TR  )1(logloglog
*
*
*
*
 ,   (6) 
where 
*
*
TR
BR , t
b
t BRlog  and t
nb
t NBRlog . 
We postulate, similarly to Walsh (2003), a simple reserve borrowing function:5   
b
t
d
t
f
t
b
t ii   )( .               (7) 
The manner in which a variation in fti  affects reserve borrowings, given by the coefficient 
0  in (7) depends on how such a variation affects expectations of future funds rate levels 
which are not modelled here. The shock bt  represents other factors affecting the reserve 
borrowings. The difference between fti  and 
d
ti  is due to non-price rationing of access to the 
central liquidity. If there were no nonprice rationing at the discount window, the funds interest 
rate would never rise above the discount interest rate, because a bank would never pay more 
for reserves than it would have to pay at the discount window (Goodfriend, 1983). 
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The central bank is assumed to target the funds rate through open market operations 
conducted once every day in the way that the effects on fti  of shocks affecting the reserve 
demand and the borrowed reserves are entirely compensated. Hence, the funds rate is 
determined by the discount rate. However, the funds rate targeting is imperfect since the latter 
is still subject to a monetary policy shock st  with mean zero and variance 
2
s . This kind of 
interest rate policy implies that the nonborrowed reserves are given by:6 
s
t
b
t
d
t
nb
t 




 




11
1
.              (8) 
The equilibrium condition on the reserve market, i.e. st
d
t   , can be rewritten using 
equations (5)-(8) as: 
s
t
d
t
f
t
f
t iiai  )1()(  .        (9) 
Equations (5) and (9) directly yield the solution of fti  and t in terms of 
d
ti  and shocks: 
s
t
d
t
f
t
a
i
a
i 









1
,               (10) 
d
t
s
t
d
tt
a
a
i
a
a





 





)1(
.       (11) 
The model is completed by a specification of the monetary policy maker’s objective, 
assumed to be the minimization of the variance of output deviations. By normalizing the 
economy’s equilibrium level of output so that the true steady state value of output is zero in the 
absence of shock, the central bank’s loss function is quadratic in output around zero: 
2][ tyE .                 (12) 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
5 In Walsh (2003), the functions tBR  and tNBR are not specified in log terms. It is easy to rewrite them in logs 
terms so that we have not shown the details here. In a more sophisticated version of a reserve market model, the 
total supply of reserves could also depend on future interest rates (Walsh, 1982; Goodfriends, 1983).  
6 For the implications of other operating procedures, see Walsh (2003, pages 451-71) who gives also a brief 
history of operating procedures used by the Fed and some other central banks.  
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Since the central bank has not an objective of output higher than zero, this specification avoids 
the issue of time inconsistency. As a result, we can focus on the optimal choice of monetary 
policy instruments. For simplicity, all shocks are treated as mean-zero, serially and mutually 
non-correlated process.  
   
3. Optimal instrument choice : the standard analysis 
It is assumed that the central bank must set policy before observing the current disturbances to 
the goods and money markets, and that information on interest rates, but not output, is 
immediately available. This informational assumption reflects a situation in which the central 
bank can observe market interest rates continuously, but data on inflation and output might be 
available only monthly or quarterly. With imperfect information about the evolution of the 
economy, the central bank will be unable to determine from a movement in market interest 
rates the exact source of any economic disturbances that might be affecting the economy. In 
effect, a rise in interest rate could be induced by a positive money demand shock calling for 
letting the money supply expand or a positive aggregate demand shock calling for 
contractionary monetary policy to stabilize output.  
Poole (1970) asks whether, in this kind of environment, the central bank should try to hold 
market interest rates constant or should hold a monetary quantity constant while allowing 
interest rates to move. Under the assumption that the objective of policy is to stabilize real 
output around its steady state value, the answer to his question can be obtained by comparing 
the variance of output implied by two alternatives policies.   
If the central bank controls perfectly ti  and tm , the solution to the Poole’s problem of 
optimal instrument choice can be obtained by minimizing the loss function (12) under 
alternative choices of policy instruments, subject to the reduced model constituted by equations 
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(1) and (2). The timing is as follows: the central bank sets either ti  or tm  at the start of the 
period; the stochastic shocks tu  and tv  occur, determining the value of the endogenous 
variables. If tm  is the policy instrument, ty  and ti  are endogenous. In this case, ti  is 
determined using equation (2) and then ty  is determined using the solution of ti  and equation 
(1). If the central bank chooses ti  as the policy instrument, the endogenous variables ty  and 
tm  are independent one another and they are determined respectively by equations (1) and (2). 
In effect, under the interest-rate operating procedure, the central bank allows the money stock 
to adjust endogenously to equal the money demand for given interest rate once the level of 
income is determined. 
When the money stock is the instrument, the output is:  




 tttt
uvm
y ,                                                                                   (13) 
Setting tm  so that 0][ tyE , the variance of output under money-supply procedure is: 
2
2222
2
)(
][




 uvtm yE . (14) 
Under the alternative policy, i.e. the central bank uses ti  as the policy instrument, the 
money market equilibrium condition is not anymore necessary for determining the output. The 
latter is determined using equation (1) as ttt uiy     . Setting ti  so that 0][ tyE , the 
income is given by tt uy   and the value of the objective function is: 
22][ uti yE  . (15) 
The optimal instrument choice is decided by comparing the variance of output implied by 
these two alternative operating procedures. The interest rate operating procedure is a better 
choice than the money-supply operating procedure if  22 ][][ tmti yEyE  , i.e.: 
 9 
2
2
2 )2(
uv 




 .         (16) 
Equation (17) implies that an interest-rate procedure is more likely preferred to a money-
supply procedure when the variance of money demand disturbances is larger, the LM curve is 
steeper (smaller  ) and the IS curve is flatter (larger  ), and vice versa. The control of money 
supply allows mitigating the effects of demand shock on the variance of output on the one 
hand, but contributes to increase it due to the money demand shock on the other hand.  
In practice, no central bank has direct control over a narrow monetary aggregate such as the 
monetary base. Variations in this aggregate are associated with these in broader measures of 
money supply. To take account of the implications of the imperfect control of money supply, 
Poole’s model is modified to distinguish between the base as a policy instrument and the 
money supply (B. Friedman, 1990). Substituting tm  given by equation (3) into equation (2) 
yields 
 tttttt viyhib   .                                             (17)  
Assume that the central bank directly controls ti . Under an interest-rate procedure, 
equation (17) is used to determine endogenously tb  and hence is irrelevant for output 
determination. The output is still determined by equation (1) so that ttt uiy     . Setting ti  
to minimize the variance of output leads to 22][ uti yE  , the same as before.  
Under a monetary-base operating procedure, setting tb  to minimize 
2][ tyE  subject to 
equations (1) and (17) yields the level and variance of output: 
h
vuh
y tttt




  )(
,                     (18) 
            
2
22222
2
)(
)()(
][
h
h
yE vutb




 
. (19) 
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The interest rate procedure is considered as a better choice than the monetary base 
procedure if and only if  22 ][][ tbti yEyE   or equivalently 
222 )(21 uv
h



  




 
 .                            (20)  
By directly controlling ti , the central bank is able to neutralize the effects of shocks t  on 
output. In contrast, the presence of money-multiplier shock makes the monetary base 
procedure less attractive because it makes more likely that an interest rate procedure will yield 
a smaller variance of output. This well-known standard analysis suggests that, as long as 
shocks affecting the aggregate spending is not the main source of short run instability, if the 
money demand is viewed as highly unstable and difficult to predict over short run horizons and 
the money supply is controlled with much errors, greater output stability can be achieved by 
controlling interest rates, letting monetary aggregates fluctuate endogenously. Hence, the 
extension to monetary base operating procedure reinforces the basic message of Poole’s 
analysis in the sense that increased financial sector volatility ( t  and tv ) increases the 
desirability of an interest-rate operating procedure over a monetary aggregate procedure.  
However, we remark that the above extension has introduced an asymmetrical assumption 
concerning the controllability of monetary aggregates and interest rates: the central bank 
controls imperfectly the money supply through the control of monetary base while it can 
perfectly control the interest rate. 
In the following, we examine the implication of an alternative assumption according to 
which the central bank indirectly controls ti  through a funds rate operating procedure. Under 
this procedure, the central bank fixes the discount rate and regularly conducts open market 
operations to minimize the fluctuations of the funds rate and hence market interest rates.  
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4. Implication of imperfect control of market interest rates  
Under the funds rate operating procedure, the central bank fixes the discount rate and conducts 
open market operations to stabilize the funds rate. Substituting t given by equation (11) into 
equation (4), we obtain the monetary base for cct   (i.e. the amount of currency is given at 
period t) as follows:  
c
a
a
i
a
a
b dt
s
t
d
tt )1(
)1(










 .      (21) 
Using equations (17) and (21), the equilibrium condition on the money market becomes 
ttttt
d
t
s
t
d
t viyhic
a
a
i
a
a





 




)1(
)1(
.       (22)  
Solving equation (22) for ti  yields  













 t
d
t
s
t
d
tttt
a
a
i
a
a
vcy
h
i 






 
)(
)1(
)(
)1(
1
.     (23)  
Substituting ti  given by equation (23) into equation (1) leads to 
))((
])1[(
  
 )()1(
ha
ia
h
uhvc
y
d
t
s
tt
d
ttt
t










.      (24)                   
Setting dti  in equation (24) to have 0][ tyE , the variance of output under the funds rate 
operating procedures is given by 
22
22222
2
2222222
2
)()(
)1(
)(
)()(
][
ha
a
h
h
yE sdvutf









  .    (25) 
Comparing the variance of output given by (19) and that given by (25), it follows that the 
funds rate procedure is preferred to monetary-base procedure if 
22 ][][ tbtf yEyE  . That leads 
to the following condition: 
0
)(
)1(
 2
2
22
2 


 sd
a
a
 


 ,           (26) 
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which is never verified since the left hand of (26) is superior to zero.  
Controlling the discount rate and conducting open market operations to target the funds 
rate do not allow the central bank to neutralize the effects of shocks t  on output. Moreover, 
this procedure generates its own shocks so that the variance of output is in effect larger under 
the funds rate operating procedure whatever is the relative importance of shocks affecting the 
aggregate spending, money-multiplier and money demand. The presence of shocks affecting 
the reserve demand and the monetary policy shock (error term st  in the non-borrowed 
reserves) make the variance of output clearly larger under a funds rate procedure than under a 
monetary base procedure. Therefore, the well-known basic message of Poole’s analysis 
according to which increased financial sector volatility increases the desirability of an interest-
rate operating procedure over a monetary aggregate procedure is only valid if the interest rate 
procedure targets the market interest rates. In the event of relatively modest aggregate demand 
shocks, the central bank would prefer an interest rate procedure to a monetary-base procedure 
if it has the mandate to directly target the market interest rates determined by the equilibrium 
condition on the money market and other financial markets. Before the current crisis, central 
banks generally target the short run interest rates. There may be rather little inconvenience if 
shocks affecting the reserve demand and the monetary policy shock affecting the funds rate are 
very small. Furthermore, a funds rate procedure has the advantage of being more transparent 
than a monetary-base procedure. During the current crisis, central banks in some countries 
have intervened in asset markets to target the interest rates that directly affect the aggregate 
spending under what is call the quantitative easing policy. This shift in monetary operating 
procedure is coherent with the implications of our findings. 
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5. Conclusion 
In an IS-LM model with reserve market, we have reexamined the issue of optimal instrument 
choice for monetary policy by comparing a funds rate operating procedure with other operating 
procedures targeting the money supply, the interest rate and the monetary base respectively. It 
is shown that, a short run interest rate operating procedure (such as funds rate procedure) is 
less effective in stabilizing output than a monetary base procedure. The fact that central banks, 
in practice, prefer to have the continuity of very short run interest rate and indirect rate 
targeting may be explained by the advantage in terms of transparency offered by a short run 
interest rate procedure, which might counterbalance the costs in terms of stabilization when 
shocks affecting the reserve demand and the monetary policy shock affecting the funds rate are 
small. In the event of extreme financial crisis, a central bank might have to directly target 
market interest rates for its interest rate policy to be successful.  
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